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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 860193-CA 
v. t 
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE# : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal. 
1. Was the evidence presented by the State at trial 
sufficient to support the verdict? 
2. Was defendant denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, James Ace florehouse, was charged with 
aggravated arson, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-103 (1978) (amended 1986)1 (R. 18-19). After a jury trial, 
he was found guilty as charged (R. 94). The trial court 
sentenced him to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to 
fifteen years, and ordered him to pay restitution in an amount to 
be determined by the Board of Pardons (R. 111). 
1
 The 1986 amendment to § 76-6-103 made aggravated arson a first 
degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the State presented the following evidence 
that supported the verdict. 
On November 1, 1985 at approximately 8:00 p.m., there 
was a fire in the attic of a gas station leased and operated by 
defendant in Salt Lake City. The fire department arrived and 
extinguished the fire. Later that evening at approximately 11:00 
p.m., a woman across the street from the station observed 
defendant enter it through a hole in the bay door which had been 
cut by firefighters earlier. Shortly thereafter, she heard 
breaking glass, saw flames coming out of the station's front 
window, and observed defendant reemerge through the hole in the 
door, walk to his car, enter it, and sit there until the fire 
department arrived. Testimony from a number of witnesses also 
established that defendant could have been at the station during 
the hour immediately prior to the 8:00 p.m. fire (R. 178-87, 441-
42 582-85) . 
Two investigators with the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department, who had expertise in arson investigation, concluded 
that both fires at the station had been intentionally set by 
igniting flammable liquids which had been poured at various 
locations in the building. They ruled out an electrical 
malfunction as the cause (R. 319, 321, 567-71). 
In the eight month period prior to the fires, defendant 
bad experienced financial losses in the operation of the station 
and had taken out an $8,000 loan because he was low on funds (R. 
266-72, 287). And, several months prior to the incident, 
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defendant had complained to the owner of the station that the 
rent was too high (R. 581). Finally, on November 4, 1985, 
defendant filed an insurance claim for the fire damage, but 
withdrew it the next day (R. 497-99). 
Defendant presented numerous witnesses in his behalf, 
including a fire expert, in an effort to establish his 
whereabouts before the first fire, to demonstrate that the 
State's expert witnesses had incorrectly concluded that the fires 
had been intentionally set, and to suggest that either a person 
seen exiting and reentering a car on the station premises at the 
time of the second fire or another person observed there by a 
neighbor was responsible for that fire (R. 615-933). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State presented sufficient evidence at trial to 
support the jury's finding that the fires at defendant's station 
were intentionally caused by defendant. 
Defendant does not demonstrate that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial. In arguing that 
counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence and to 
recognize the application of Utah R. Evid. 609 to his client 
constituted ineffective assistance, defendant fails to show 
either that counsel's performance was deficient or that any 
deficiency resulted in demonstrable prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS CONVICTION. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly set out the 
standards for appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence presented at trial: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
and will only interfere when the evidence is 
so lacking and unsubstantial that a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We also view in a light most favorable to the 
juryfs verdict those facts which can be 
reasonably inferred from the evidence 
presented to it. 
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). As noted in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . . " Stale. 
v- Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
aO££l& State v. Linden, Utah 657 P.2d 1264, 
1266 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
Id, at 345 (citations omitted). And, even if the appellate court 
views the evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if 
contradictory evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the 
verdict should be upheld, state v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 
1982). In short, "on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged 
to accept the version of the facts which supports the verdict." 
4-
S t a t e v . I s a a c s o n . 704 P.2d 555 , 556 (Utah 1985) ( c i t i n g S t a t e V, 
flSttSli, 649 P.2d a t 9 3 ) . 
Defendants argue that the evidence presented by the 
State at trial was insufficient to support a jury finding that 
arson had occurred or, assuming that there was arson, that 
defendant was the responsible party. 
First, defendants claim that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove arson ignores the opinion testimony of the 
State's two expert witnesses — William Memmott and Gary Mclff 
(R. 319, 321, 567-71). That Lt. Mauerman may have initially 
concluded that the first fire was electrically caused does not 
undercut the opinions given by Memmott and Mclff. It was 
Mauerman who called in the experts after the second fire because 
that later fire appeared to have been caused by flammable 
liquids; his investigation of the first fire clearly was not as 
complete as that conducted by the experts (R. 216-217). And, 
that defendant's expert reached different conclusions is of no 
consequence. The jury had the prerogative to decide the weight 
and credibility to be given the expert testimony. State v. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983). Significantly, a similar 
insufficiency argument was recently rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Utah 1986). 
Although the evidence against defendant was primarily 
circumstantial, it clearly connected him with the second fire 
and, when viewed in light of the authority on review of a 
sufficiency claim cited above and the Supreme Court's holding on 
somewhat similar facts in Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126-27, was 
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sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant was 
responsible for the arson. Defendant's heavy reliance on State 
v- Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986)
 f is misplaced, in that a 
majority of the Court determined that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the defendants' convictions in that case. Hill. 727 
P.2d at 223-25 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (Hall, 
C.J., dissenting, with Howe, J., concurring in the dissenting 
opinion of Hall, C.J.). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS 
DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL. 
On appeal, defendant alleges that trial counsel's 
performance was both deficient and prejudicial when counsel 
failed to object to the admission of certain evidence purportedly 
seized in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and when he misunderstood the application of Utah 
R. Evid. 609 in advising defendant not to testify at trial. 
Defendant presented the second part of this argument to the trial 
court in a motion for a new trial, but was denied relief (R. 122-
23, 1147). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
justifying reversal of a conviction, "it is the defendant's 
burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome 
of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's 
error." State v. Geary* 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). As 
summarized in State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)5 
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In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, godianna v. 
ttajLLifir 660 P.2d 1101, 1109-09 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must prove that specifier 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised "reasonable 
professional judgment." Strickland v. 
Washington* 466 u.s. 668, 104 s.ct. 2052, 
2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); ^tate v. Lairbv. 
699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984). And, an 
unfavorable result does not compel a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State V. Buehl* 700 P.2d at 703. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough 
to claim that the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome or could 
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists 
that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different. We have defined 
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the verdict. 
723 P.2d at 405 (footnote citation omitted). Defendant fails to 
satisfy this two-pronged standard on either of his 
ineffectiveness claims. 
In his motion for a new trial and the hearing on that 
motion before the trial court, defendant neither alleged 
ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to move to 
suppress certain evidence nor presented any evidence in support 
of that claim (R. 122-23, 1084-1150). A review of defendant's 
appellate argument on this point (Br. of App. at 15-19) indicates 
that it is based almost entirely on speculation about when 
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certain physical evidence was obtained by the investigating 
officers and the extent to which evidence obtained at different 
times provided the basis for the officers1 conclusion that the 
fires were the result of arson. Consequently, defendant is 
unable to present any cogent argument that trial counsel should 
have known that certain evidence was inadmissible under Michigan 
3Li Tylerr 436 U.S. 499 (1978), or Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 
287 (1984), and was therefore obliged to file a motion to 
suppress. £££, e g . , United States v. Wheeler* 800 F.2d 100, 106 
(7th Cir. 1986); Lockhart v. McCotter. 782 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 
1986). In addition to his failure to develop the facts necessary 
to demonstrate that critical evidence was obviously excludable 
under those two cases, defendant makes no effort to show that the 
evidence would have been suppressed under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-12(g) (1982)), the controlling rule for 
motions to suppress brought under the fourth amendment or article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. That rule provides that 
evidence will not be suppressed unless it is established that the 
violation is "both substantial and not committed in good faith." 
Sfi£ Aififi United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith 
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule established 
in warrant context); Illinois v. Krull. U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 
1160 (1987) (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence 
obtained as a result of warrantless search conducted pursuant to 
reasonable reliance on unconstitutional statute); United States 
v. Williams. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), fifiJLt. denied. 449 U.S. 
1127 (1981) (good faith exception to exclusionary rule adopted in 
warrantless context). 
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Although it may in some instances constitute grounds 
for reversal of a conviction, counsel's failure to file a fourth 
amendment suppression motion is not £££ £& ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Kimmelman v> MorrisQiif U.S. , , 106 S.Ct. 
2574f 2588 (1986). Because counsel's competence is presumed, the 
defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by 
proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under 
prevailing professional norms. UkicL. Defendant has not carried 
this burden. For example, there is no showing that a suppression 
motion probably would have succeeded and no evidence that counsel 
was guilty of the egregious failure to pursue discovery of the 
prosecution's evidence that the attorney in Kimmelman was. 
Indeed, contrary to the situation in Kimmelman, where deficient 
performance was found, defendant's counsel conducted extensive 
discovery and called numerous defense witnesses. 
Furthermore, defendant fails to demonstrate the 
requisite prejudice suffered by this alleged deficiency in 
counsel's performance. His only specific reference to allegedly 
inadmissible evidence is to pictures taken three days after the 
fire by Captain Memmott. Br. of App. at 16. His vague 
references to "some evidence" seized by Memmott or other 
investigators, id., at 16, 19, as being inadmissible are 
meaningless. Defendant simply does not offer any substantial 
basis for concluding that it is reasonably probable that 
exclusion of the challenged photographs and other unidentified 
evidence (which defendant alleges was not excluded due to 
counsel's error) would have produced a different result in his 
trial. 
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Defendant's alternate claim of ineffectiveness fares 
little better. Without even identifying any of his prior 
convictions, defendant argues that counsel was legally 
ineffective when he advised him not to testify at trial (even 
though defendant wished to) because the prosecution would likely 
cross-examine him on those convictions for impeachment purposes. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant's 
trial counsel testified that, when he gave defendant the advice, 
he was not aware of the applicable rule of evidence —Utah R. 
Evid. 609.2 However, as in the lower court, defendant presents 
no persuasive argument that his prior convictions were plainly 
inadmissible under Rule 609, thereby rendering counsel's 
pertormance deficient. Indeed, because of the absence of any 
1
 Rule 609 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of 
a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is 
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness 
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is 
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written 
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence. 
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references to prior convictions or any legal analysis of the 
admissibility question, this Court should decline to address 
defendant's ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Amicone. 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to 
support [her] argument by any legal analysis or authority, we 
decline to rule on it.")j State v. One 1982 Silver Honda. 55 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 46, 48 n. 4, P.2d. , n. 4 (1987). Even if the 
Court were to address the issue, it is at least an open question 
whether defendant's convictions for burglary and theft,^ for 
example, could have been brought out on cross-examination under 
Rule 609(a)(2). As noted by the trial court, federal case law 
and at least one Utah case strongly suggest that burglary and 
theft are crimes involving dishonesty for purposes of Rule 
609(a)(2) (R. 1142-47). See State v. Cintron. 680 P.2d 33, 34 
(Utah 1984) (theft is crime involving dishonesty under former 
Utah R. Evid. 21 (a rule similar to Rule 609(a)(2)); Annot.. 39 
ALR Fed. 570, 596-99 (1978 & Supp. 1986).4 Cf. State v. Banner. 
717 P.2d 1325, 1334-35 (Utah 1986). Moreover, defendant's 
convictions for those felonies might well have been admissible 
under Rule 609(a)(1). Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334. Thus, one 
•> Defendant was convicted of burglary and theft in 1973 and 
released from incarceration for those offenses in 1978 (R. 1139-
40). Therefore, subsection (b) of Rule 609 does not apply. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never construed Rule 609(a)(2); 
however, it has made clear that, in accordance with the intent of 
the advisory committee for Utah's new rules of evidence, it will 
•lookM to the interpretations of the federal rules by the 
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Gray, 
717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986)). 
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cannot fairly conclude that counsel's advice to defendant was 
clearly erroneous, or that the deficient performance prong of the 
ineffectiveness test has been satisfied. 
Finally, defendant does not disclose what his testimony 
would have been had he taken the stand or how it may have 
affected the outcome of his trial. During the hearing on 
defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant's trial counsel 
acknowledged that defendant's anticipated testimony would only 
have been corroborative of testimony given by other defense 
witnesses (R. 1118-20)• Under these circumstances, defendant has 
not shown any actual prejudice suffered because of counsel's 
allegedly deficient performance, and thus is unable to satisfy 
the second prong of the ineffectiveness test. As noted in Laom 
v. State, 284 Ark. 426, 682 S.W.2d 755 (1985): 
IA] petitioner must do more than simply state 
that he was not allowed to testify. He must 
state specifically what the content of his 
testimony would have been and demonstrate 
that his failure to testify resulted in 
actual prejudice to his defense. To 
reiterate, there can be no finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel without a 
showing of prejudice sufficient to undermine 
the proper functioning of the judicial 
process. stricKland v» Washington» 
682 S.W.2d at 758. £££. jal&fi State v. Johnson. 719 P.2d 771 
(Mont. 1986); State v. Carriger. 143 Ariz. 142, 692 P.2d 991, 
1004 (1984), ££JtJt. denied. 471 U.S. 1111 (1985). Insofar as 
United States v. Butts. 630 F.Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986), a case 
relied on by defendant, stands for the proposition that the 
prejudice required for an ineffectiveness claim is presumed from 
the deprivation of a defendant's right to testify, it appears to 
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be inconsistent with the Strickland standard adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court* 
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel. To the contrary, the 
record indicates that defendant, on the whole, received excellent 
representation from counsel, who conducted extensive pretrial 
investigation, thoroughly cross-examined the prosecution's 
witnesses, and presented numerous witnesses in defendant's 
behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. //L~— 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this O ^ d a y of May, 19 87. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON ft 
Assistant Attorney General 
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